foreign currency liquidity through its Competitive Auction Swap Facility using its official foreign reserves, and through its Competitive Auction Loan Facility using the proceeds of its currency swaps with the U .S . Federal Reserve . On October 19, the Korean government also guaranteed its banking sector's external debt until the end of June 2009 .
To strengthen its defense against global illiquidity, the BOK established a US$30 billion swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve on October 30, 2008 . On December 12, the BOK entered into a 180 billion yuan/38 trillion won swap arrangement with the People's Bank of China (PBC), and at the same time agreed with the Bank of Japan (BOJ) on expanding the ceiling of existing won/ yen swap arrangements from the equivalent of 3 billion U .S . dollars to 20 billion dollars . In spite of such efforts, deleveraging continued, and the CRS rate often fell into negative territory in February, March, and April 2009 . Figure 1 clearly shows that the foreign exchange liquidity conditions have not fully recovered yet . Domestic credit spreads on corporate and bank bonds have also widened rapidly with the illiquidity in the domestic money market . This phenomenon, often termed "double drain," was unprecedented for Korea .
The Bank of Korea has responded with aggressive interest rate cuts to alleviate the credit crunch . It cut the "BOK base rate" on six occasions, by 3 .25 percent overall . It also provided a total of 27 .8 trillion won in market liquidity-by conducting open market operations, increasing the ceiling of its aggregate credit ceiling loan program, making banks a one-off payment of interest on In addition to the global crisis, the Korean economy suffered from the oil price hikes that occurred during the first half of 2008 . From the second half of 2008, both the Korean export and domestic sectors began to feel the impact of the decline in international demand, and the fourth quarter annual GDP growth rate fell to -5 .1 percent .
2 In January 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its forecast for Korean GDP growth from a positive 2 percent to a 4 percent contraction . This was among its largest downward revisions for emerging market economies .
The rise in external debt has been a main cause for concern among foreign investors, even though the most recent increase in debt, that acquired since 2006, has differed in structure from that in the period prior to the onset of the East Asian crisis . A major share of the increase in debt has been bridge financing by domestic banks . These banks engaged in forward contracts with exporters and asset management companies, and balanced their positions through borrowing . Furthermore, bad loan problems analogous to those that contributed to the Asian financial crisis did not exist .
The external debt of the banking sector drew particular attention .
3 For the whole economy, the mismatch between the external assets and debts did not widen, but strong asymmetry existed in the private sector as foreign assets were concentrated in the monetary authority, and foreign debts were concentrated in the banking sector (Table 1) . This left severe mismatches in the banking sector . The riskiness of the banking sector may not be coincidental . Figure 2 plots the rate of growth of the banking sector's external debt percentages and the short-term external assets to short-term external debt ratios during 1995:Q1-2008:Q4 . There is a negative relationship between these two variables, which indicates that when banks accumulate external debt, they tend to rely more on short-term debt . Thus, when banks accumulate external debts, both the risks of currency mismatch and of maturity mismatches tend to increase .
Before the global crisis, the banking sector pushed up leverage in Korea, while after the Lehman collapse, it suffered most from Korean deleveraging . This can be clearly seen from Tables 2 and 3 . They present the flows of foreign liquidity funds in the pre-crisis and crisis periods, respectively . During 2006:Q1-2008:Q3 of the 168 billion dollars flowing into Korea, 137 .4 billion dollars were funded by the banking sector, 68 .3 billion dollars were domestically absorbed, and the rest were recycled through overseas equity investment, foreign direct investment, remuneration of foreign equity investment, etc . During this period, the monetary authorities were net sellers of foreign liquidity . As described above, Korea's experiences during this crisis can be summarized in terms of the capital inflows problem . Procyclicality generated by capital flows has been a major cause of vulnerability for small open economies as they can cause boom-bust cycles (e .g ., Kaminsky et al ., 2005) . Excessive foreign capital inflows lead to current account deficits and can cause asset bubbles and increase vulnerability to external credit tightening, which often result in sudden stops and reversals of financial flows . Since the East Asian crisis, the Korean economy has progressed towards closer integration with global financial markets . Its liberalized capital market has invited foreign capital inflows-but this has also enabled foreign investors to unwind their positions at the earliest signs of trouble .
The procyclicality of the banking sector borrowing can be confirmed in Figure 3 . It plots the growth rates of foreign assets and debt calculated from the banking sector balance sheet during 1995:Q3 to 2009:Q1 . Dots tend to be on the 45-degree line, which implies that once the banking sector as a whole increases its foreign debt its balance sheet expands in lockstep, and vice versa . Through financial intermediation the growth of foreign debts is translated into growth of foreign assets, which push up domestic demand through various channels .
How important is the procyclicality of capital flows originated in the banking sector? Table 4 lists measures of procyclicality of various components of net capital inflows to Korea . Surely, capital flows driven by the banks are the most problematic .
Korea's recent experience offers important policy implications . Capital account liberalization in small open economies increases vulnerability to sudden large-scale withdrawals of foreign capital, and that is exactly what we have witnessed during the recent crisis . It should be noted that this problem has even occurred in countries with strong financial regulation and transparent financial systems such as Korea .
It has been argued that financial globalization makes it possible to enjoy collateral benefits such as domestic financial sector development, institutional improvements, better macroeconomic policies, etc . These collateral benefits have been said to result in higher growth for the globalizing countries, generally via gains in allocative efficiency . The recent crisis has demonstrated, however, that financial globalization can lead to collateral damage in emerging One could defend oneself from such collateral damage by sufficient reserve accumulation . But here the question arises: How sufficient is sufficient? According to the Greenspan-Guidotti-Fischer rule, short-term borrowing abroad by the private sector should be absorbed as foreign reserves by the monetary authorities . However, the rule might invite moral hazard: While profits from borrowing are privatized, hedging of the associated risk is socialized (Rodrik 2006) . Consequently, the private sector would like to rely on short-term borrowing even more and the monetary authorities must accumulate even greater reserves . Furthermore, the moral hazard problem exacerbates the overall level of capital inflows .
Direct regulation on capital flows may be another viable option . However, there is little evidence that capital controls are effective in achieving their macroeconomic objectives for longer than limited periods . The best solution, in my opinion, is to establish an incentive mechanism that can harmonize the individual player's optimizing activity in a way not to cause a deterioration of the system soundness, that is, by internalizing the cost of short-term external borrowings .
